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F or at least the first year after the American in vasion oflraq, the Sunni resistancein Iraq was regarded as a nebulous group of fighters who were unorganizedand had no focused political viewpoint. Only at the height of the revolt of
Falluja in April and November 2004. and especially during the months preceding the
elections of January 2005, did it become apparent that some links existed between the
insurgency and political parties and organizations. The massive response to the call to
vote against the new constitution during the referendum of 15 October eliminated any
doubts that might have existed as to whether there were any links between Sunni politi-
cal groupings and the Sunni insurgency.' Answering the call of the political parties, the
resistance laid down its arms for the duration of the referendum and encouraged Sunms
to vote against the constitution. This relation between political Sunni organizations
and the resistance was further underscored during the general elections in December
2005, when the resistance encouraged the Sunni community to vote again.
The result was a very high turn out: more than seventy percent of the population
of the so-called "Sunni Triangle" voted. Even in a devastated city like Falluja, eighty
percent of the population voted. When the final results were announced in January
2006, thelraqi Consensus Front (Jabhatal-Tawafuq at- 'Iraqi}, a coalition of the Islamic
Iraqi Party) (al-Hizb al-lslami al- 'Iraqi), the Iraqi People's Conference (al-Mu 'tamar
al-'Amm li Ahl al-'lraq) and the National Iraqi Dialogue Council (Majlis al-Hiwar
al-Watani al- 'Iraqi) had gained forty-four seats in the 275-member parliament. The
Ba'mist National Iraqi Dialogue Front (al-Jabha al- 'Iraqiyya li al-Hiwar al- Watani) of
Salih al-Mutlaq gained eleven seats. In total, the Sunni Arab votes won some fifty-five
seats: hence a major step had been taken to establish a strong Sunni political presence
in parliament in order to influence the "political process" (al- 'amaliyyaal-siyasiyya), as
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it is commonly called. The Shi'i United Iraqi Alliance, however, had gained 128 seats,
just short of a majority of 13 8 seats, while the Kurdistan Coalition, with whom the UIA
had formed a coalition government in April 2005, won fifty-three seats. Despite the
brief ceasefire and the achievement of a solid Sunni political presence in parliament,
it is clear that the armed resistance is still strong. Since the elections, suicide bomb
attacks have not only continued, but also in fact increased. What has changed is that
the Sunni community has been able to add a political wing to its armed struggle.
Whether the armed resistance will be supplanted by the political process depends
on the success of the political wing in thwarting the main principles of Shi'i policy, as
laid down in the constitution that was accepted in August 2005: de-Ba'tbification and
the ban on all senior Ba'thist functionaries, a measure regarded as directed primarily
against the Sunnis, many of whom were the main props of the regime; the establish-
ment of a federal state with wide-ranging authority for the individual provinces, and
assuming provincial control over oil resources. The effectiveness of the Sunni political
organizations depends to a large extent on the control they will be able to maintain
over the Sunni community. Especially since the failure of the boycott of the general
elections of January 2005, the political process has re-emerged and the position of
those in favor of complete boycott has been weakened.
This article traces the emergence of the Association of Muslim Scholars, (Hay 'at
al- 'Ulama 'al-Musiimin), its temporary success during the boycott of the January 2005
elections, and the problems it has encountered during the referendum and the general
elections in December 2005.2 It falls into two chronological parts. The first part deals
with the broad strategy that the AMS pursued between the time of the first Falluja crisis
in 2004 and the elections of January 2005. This will address the AMS' conceptualiza-
tion of the Iraqi problem and its solutions, in addition to its attainment of hegemony
over its rivals, while in the second part, running from the elections of January 2005
to those of December 2005, the weakness and subsequent gradual adjustments in the
strategy of the AMS will be analyzed.
The Emergence of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)
The AMS was founded five days after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein
on 14 April 2003. with the intention of supporting and defending nationwide Sunni
religious institutions such as mosques and madrasas.' The AMS has its roots in the
Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Iraq in 1951 as the Islamic Brotherhood
Society.4 Despite the Faith Campaign Saddam Hussein launched in the 1990s, many
of the leaders of the Islamist movement had fied the regime of Saddam Hussein and
had lived abroad as refugees. The AMS was established as a nationwide organization
of Sunni religious scholars of all viewpoints, whether traditional 'ulama ', modernists,
Sufis or Salafis. In theory it is ethnically inclusive, addressing itself to Sunni Kurds
and Turkmen, although in practice the AMS is primarily a network of Sunni Arab
'ulama' with a few Kurdish members. Its headquarters is the huge Umm al-Qura
mosque, formerly the Mother of all Battles mosque (Jami' Umm al-Ma'arik), built
by Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, which is famous for its minarets built in the form of
Kalashnikovs.
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The leadership of the AMS is represented by its secretary general. Harith al-
Dhari, and its official internal spokesmen: his son Muthanna al-Dhari, ' Abd al-Salam
al-Kubaysi and Bashar al-Faydhi, as well as its foreign spokesman, Muhammad
'Ayyash al-Kubaysi, who also doubles as chief ideologue of the AMS. In line with
the movement's modern character, its leaders are well versed in using the media to
propagate its ideology and its political program. This is done through a continuous
stream of communiqués (bayanat), regular press conferences, and continuous update
of information on the AMS presented on its website' as well as in its daily newspaper.
al-Basa 'irf In addition, to addressing the Iraqi Sunni community, the AMS is also
active on a regional level. Numerous interviews with Harith al-Dhari, Muhammad
Bashar al-Faydhi, and especially Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi, in the regional Arab
media, and especially ai-Jazeera television in Qatar, all aim to bring the ideas of the
AMS into the regional limelight.
Since its foundation, the AMS has disseminated the sameuncompromising program:
the American presence is illegal and should not only be considered an "occupation"
but as harmful to the general interests of Iraq as a nation. Even before the American
invasion, Harith al-Dhari condemned the American threat to Iraq, considering it a
duty to resist the coming invasion.* Its anti-Western attitude is underlined in its politi-
cal program, which ascribes the failure of the reform of Islam to foreign cultural and
political dominance.' The AMS, however, is a typical Islamo-nationalist movement
that legitimates the struggle for liberation in nationalist and religious terms, and does
not, in contrast to the Salafi movement, cast the 'political' struggle between the Middle
East and the West as a struggle of Islam against the West.'J Framed in the nationalist
terminology of Harith al-Dhari, "We as Iraqis limit ourselves to defending our country
and we know what the interests of this country are."" The activities of a transnational
terrorist organisation like al-Qa 'idafi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia)
is therefore rejected not only for its indiscriminate killing of Iraqi citizens, especially
Shi'is, but also because Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi is a "non-Iraqi and a foreigner" and
has "other goals than the national resistance".'! This nationalist attitude of the AMS
has been translated into the rejection of any form of cooperation with the Americans,
whether in the form of the Interim Governing Council installed in July 2003, ' the pro-
visional government of lyad al-'Allawi in June 2004,u or the meeting of the National
Conference in August as a preliminary step before the general elections scheduled for
January 2005. 'Above all, the AMS consistently refused to take part in elections "as
long as the occupation remains in existence" and has not drawn up a timetable for its
evacuation. This overall image of the AMS as a force of steadfast resistance has been
enhanced by the projection of the history of its leaders as an integral part of the nation-
alist struggle for independence. For instance, Harith al-Dhan's grandfather, Shaykh
Dhari, was one of the Sunni leaders of the 1920 revolt against the British occupation,
while Muhammad 'Ayyash stresses his clan relations with Falluja during the attack
by the Americans of the town in the summer and autumn of 2004.
In contrast to its own image as a steadfast oppositional force to the American
invasion, the other major Sunni organizations are portrayed as willing to compromise
(tahadun) with the Americans. How and why the Iraqi Islamic Party (HP) and the AMS
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formed separate bodies after the fall of the regime is obscure (since both have their
origins in the Muslim Brotherhood), but it is clear that the IIP has adopted a much more
liberal attitude. It claims that it stresses largely middle-class values, such as pluralism,
parliamentary democracy, tolerance and non-violence, espoused by the Brotherhood
members in other Arab countries, especially Egypt and the London-based branch of
the Syrian Brotherhood led by 'Ali al-Bayanuni.'" Like its sister organizations, the IIP
has drawn up a program that accepts pluralism, a parliamentary system and elections.1"
The AMS also differs from another, more moderate, competitor, 'Adnan al-Dulaymi.
the head of the Sunni Waqf Council (Diwan al-Waqf al-Sunni), who established the
Iraqi People's Conference in 2004 and joined the Iraqi Consensus Front in October
2005 in order to run in the electron. The competition between these currents within
the Sunni community does not mean that the AMS severed its relations with its rivals.
Some 'u/ama ' members of the IIP are also members of the AMS, but on account of the
incompatible strategies of the two organizations, this has led to severe strains between
members of the IIP and some have resigned from the AMS. The main difference is
that, whereas the IIP attempts to channel the resistance to the American occupation
into political negotiations, the AMS aims to create a broader national armed resistance
against the Americans.
The position adopted by the AMS to counter its rivals is to regard itself as stand-
ing above the political parties as "a religious authority and an authority on Islamic
law" (marja 'iyya diniyya wa shar 'iyya).w In this manner the AMS asserts the age old
claim of the 'ulama ' that they, through their religious knowledge, should assume a
moral and legal authority over the believers, expressed succinctly in Harith al-Dhari's
own terms as a task to "bring the Sunni community under one roof." In that sense the
AMS, according to its spokesmen, is "not a political party, nor a movement." Rather
it "contains political parties" and leaves room for "a diversity of opinions".-0 On the
other hand, the AMS does acknowledge its political role, and it is clear that it has a
political program and strives for political power, as is apparent from 'Abd al-Salam
al-Kubaysi 's statement that it is the "national and religious duty of the 'ulama ' [to] lead
the people on the right path.21 The only reason that the AMS does not openly present
itself as a political party. al-Dhari claims, is that "to do so would mean to legitimate
the present political situation."" Thus, the AMS reveals a certain ambivalence. On
the one hand it adopts the classical attitude of the 'ulama ' in condemning politics as
morally corrupting and it maintains a certain aloofness from its vagaries as a "religious
authority". On the other hand, it uses every modern technical means at its disposal to
disseminate its ideas and continuously interferes in the political process.
The major political breakthrough of the AMS occurred during the first crisis in
Falluja in April 2004. The AMS took advantage of this opportunity by firmly sup-
porting the local insurgents and propagating the notion that it was a popular revolt,1'
while mobilizing its mosque infrastructure to collect food and medical help. Such clear
support for the resistance marked a major change in the relationship between Sunni
political forces and the insurgency. The AMS' active support for the resistance, both
during and after the Falluja crisis, provided it with a more elaborate ideological justi-
fication of the right to resist, thus addressing the general feelings of injustice and the
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outrage Sunnis felt after the fall of the Ba'th regime and the subsequent discrimination
against them on the part of the Americans. Yet it also lifted the ideological rhetoric of
the resistance, which had been mainly formulated in tribal terms of honor, to a much
higher ideological plane.24 Through its ideological input and its access to the regional
and international media the AMS turned Falluja symbolically into a. Sunni Stalingrad
against the American occupation. Tactically, this move enabled the AMS both to
counter the American propaganda that tried to discredit the resistance by labelling it
terrorism, as well as acquire ideological hegemony over its rivals, especially the IIP.
whose image was tarnished by its membership in the Interim Governing Council, (even
though it had opposed the decision to attack Falluja and had resigned from the 'Allawi
government).25 For the AMS, this was a classic opportunity for it to attempt to become
the "face" of the Sunni resistance.26 In line with its claims to ideological leadership, it
made a self-conscious attempt to "guide" (tarshid) the political concepts to which the
resistance had adhered until then." To underscore this claim, the AMS stated that it
regarded itself as "spiritually" (ruhan) close to the resistance but that it did not claim
to be its political leadership.2* At the same time it was important to distinguish itself
ideologically from another, more radical rival that emerged during the Falluja crisis.
thejihadi Salafi group of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which propagated total war against
the Americans without any ultimate aim of reaching a political agreement.
Constructing an Ideology of Resistance
How did the AMS try to fill the ideological and political vacuum of the Sunni
community after the collapse of the Ba'th regime and the first Falluja crisis? How did
the AMS conceptualize the problems the Sunni community encountered, what solu-
tions did it provide, and how did these solutions relate to its main form of resistance,
the political boycott?
The AMS tried to construct an ideology that appealed simultaneously to all sections
of the Sunni community and the insurgency.2' In its own words it created a "roof* for
the Sunni community by catering to secular Iraqi nationalists and Pan-Arab Ba'thists
and defending the Arab and national unity of Iraq. It intended to appeal to the middle
class members of the Muslim Brotherhood by stressing the Islamic identity of the
Iraqi Sunnis and leaving room for political negotiations, albeit under severe conditions
(establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops); and it addressed itself
to the radical Islamist Salafis, who had become part of the resistance during the Falluja
crisis, by inc\uamgjihad, although it was not propagated in its public communiqués.
Finally, it also tried to include tribal values by stressing the concept of honor and
traditional values of loyalty. Besides numerous interviews with its leaders, television
debates in which they participated, and the communiqués (bavanat), the ideas of the
AMS were systematically expressed by Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi in a series
of twenty articles under the title On the Jurisprudence of Resistance and Jihad, which
were partially published in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood weekly, al-Sabil.x Five
topics stand out especially in the ideology of the AMS.
First, the ideological legitimation to resist was initially primarily couched in a
non-Islamic discourse of international law. In a debate during a television program on
al-Jazeera just after the fall of Falluja in November 2004, when the whole of ' Anbar
Meijer * 97
province was in revolt and it was clear that the resistance was there to stay, Muhammad
' Ayyash al-Kubaysi stated that every population, whether Vietnamese or Arab, non-
Muslim or Muslim, had the right to armed resistance against the forceful occupation
of its country. As it was a natural human right (haqq al-insan) it was not necessary
to call for a jihad or issue a fatwa to sanction it.11 This hesitation to call for jihad was
confirmed during one of Harith al-Dhari 's khutbas during the first Falluja crisis in April
2004, when he refused to comply with the demand of his audience to declare j'î/ifli/."
Instead of the term jihad, the AMS preferred the term muqawama, resistance.
Like Hamas, from whom AMS borrowed the Islamo-nationalist terminology of
rejecting foreign occupation (ihtilal) and boycotting elections, the term resistance
became the central frame of reference." By comparing the American presence to the
Jsraeii occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the AMS reversed the American claim
to have liberated Iraq. It regarded the invasion as an "occupation" and as part of a
"Zionist-American invasion".34 m the first of his twenty articles, al-Kubaysi explained
why AMS prefers the term muqawama and the general right of resistance to the term
jihad.3* As in the debate on al-Jazeera, the main arguments against calling for a jihad
are first that the defence of one's "religion" (din), "possession" (mal), "land" (ard).
"honor" {'ird), and "dignity" (sharaf) is a "human right" (haqq al-insan). Another
reason why one needed to be careful with the termjihadis that the concept is too broad,
as it covers two meanings, an offensive war of expansion (jihad al-Solab or jihad al-
fath) and a defensive war of resistance (jihadal-daf). The first meaning in particular
might discourage non-Muslims from joining the national struggle for independence.
Moreover, the term muqanama implies a jihad al-daf, which is clear to Muslims and
therefore does not need to be stressed separately."
However, despite this effort to couch the insurgency in secular terms, it is clear
that the AMS gave it a religious legitimation as well. Interestingly, in defence of jihad,
al-Kubaysi uses a Salafi mode of reasoning. This is especially apparent in his vehement
condemnation of moderate 'ulama '. who opposejihad, as hypocrites (munafiqun), one
of the prominent themes in Salafi writings. In stressing the importance of resistance, he
asserts that this is not the time for leniency (tasamuh), and pliability (lin). In a direct
attack on the Islamic umma by the unbelievers, there is no place for moderation and
the peaceful spreading of the "cal!" (da 'wa). There is only room for armed resistance,
and all Muslim activities should be subordinated lojihad.^ What especially enrages
him is the argument that jihad is rejected because "the balance of forces" (tawazun
al-quwa) is in favor of the Americans. How would the Prophet Muhammad have
been able to overcome the overwhelming odds at the battle of Badr if he had accepted
this principle? And how can we accept injustice (zhulm) and unbelief (kufr) without
resistance, he asks rhetorically.18 In another of his articles, he stresses the Salafi
relationship between tawhid, the necessity of steadfastness (stantid and istimrar) and
the duty of resistance against the tyrant (taghut). Resistance has in this sense become
a struggle against taghut and has become a fard 'ayn that can only be ignored at the
risk of denying tawhid3''
Underlining the glory and the necessity of resisting the enemy in one of his later
articles in his series entitled The Jurisprudence of Resistance and Jihad, Muhammad
'Ayyash al-Kubaysi states that joining the muqawama is a "duty of the times" (wajib
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al-v.'aqt). He argues that every period has its own specific duties/decisions that are
essential for the preservation of the Islamic umma. During the life of the Prophet this
was the hijra, while in later periods, when Islam was established and consolidated, it
consisted of building mosques and carrying out other good deeds. Now, however, in
the face of a aggressive attack, "the duty for the times" is to take up arms (nafir) and
the call for taking up arms (istinfar), an action that takes precedence over all other
duties like fasting and even prayer. This supremacy of resistance and sacrifice implies a
redefinition afal-wala'waal-bara '(loyalty and keepingdistance) and drawing the lines
between to whom one belongs and whom one is against.4" Quoting extensively from
the Qur'an, al-Kubaysi regards excuses for not joining the resistance as stemming from
fear and cowardice, egoism, wavering, doubt, and conceit. All these are characteristic
features of the hypocrites mentioned in the Qur'an.41
Third, while the AMS adopted an uncompromising stand on the predominance of
resistance and glorified force, it tried to make a distinction between legitimate Sunni
resistance against the American occupation and the indiscriminate terrorism of more
radical groups like those of Abu Mus'abal-Zarqawi, who started hisoperations in Falluja,
and whose actions were increasingly directed against Iraqi Shi'is who are described
as "collaborators." In making the distinction between resistance and terrorism, the
AMS made an important contribution to constructing a counter-frame to the American
attempt to tar the whole Iraqi resistance with the brush of terrorism, as is apparent
from one of the press conferences of Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, when he
condemned the resistance in Falluja as consistingof only "thuqs, gangs,and terrorists."j:
In numerous communiqués, the AMS condemned terrorist attacks against "innocent
people" (abriya ').•" The official position of the AMS is that both Iraqi civilians and
the Iraqi military belong to this category.44 This term even applied to the recruits of the
National Guard, who were mostly Shi'is and were used increasingly by the Americans
against the Sunni resistance. Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi stated that according to
Islamic law, "these people must be convicted in a court of law and cannot be executed
without legal proceedings." The major distinction he makes between an American
soldier and a member of the Security Forces is that the first is part of the occupation
while the latter is an Iraqi citizen (minvatin) and a member of the Iraqi nation and the
Islamic umma and that the rules of'jihad do not apply to him.'" The AMS did, however,
condemn in a fatwa the recruitment of Iraqis to the Security Forces.4* As part of its
condemnation of random violence and its role in giving ideological guidance (tarshid),
the AMS condemned the kidnapping of foreigners and worked as an intermediary m
the release of French and I t a l i a n hostages in the summer of 2004.4:
Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi has exerted great efforts to demonstrate that
American attempts to discredit the resistance by associating it with negative terms such
as terror (irhab), suicide (intihar), and extremism (tatarruj}, are really propaganda. "Is
everyone who rejects the occupation an extremist?" he asks himself rhetorically. In
his eyes, martyrdom differs from suicide. While the second "is weak and cannot face
up to the hardships of life (lacks sumud) and flees from its responsibilities, lacks faith,
purpose, and goals, the first is strong and courageous and faces death with equanimity
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and a strong faith ( 'aqida wad/ha) for a noble goal (hadaf nab:/).i' As for the foreign
fighters in theresistance, another argument used by the American authorities to discredit
the resistance, Harith a!-Dhari points out that these foreign fighters are only a minority
and, as an auxiliary force, have a largely symbolic function to underline the solidarity of
the Islamic umma with the Iraqi resistance against occupation.4" According to al-Dhari,
American propaganda should only be considered a means of concealing American
fears of the Sunni population."1
Despite its attempts to distinguish between resistance and terrorism, the AM S
only addressed the issue of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi directly and straightforwardly on
15 September 2005, when it condemned him in one of its communiqués.'1 Until that
time most leaders of the AMS had denied his existence, regarding him as a "media
fantasy,""2 a figmenîof "American imagination,"" and as a deliberate attempt to foment
ethnic strife.
Fourth, the success of the AMS was based on translating the concept oftheAmerican
"occupation" into a policy of an uncompromising boycott of all political institutions
as long as the United States had not drawn up a timetable for troop withdrawal. The
common AMS argument is that "true democracy is impossible under an occupation."
The angle the AMS chose to frame this ideologicai point was to accuse the Americans
of deliberately instigating sectarian strife (al-ßtna al-ta'ißyya).* From the moment the
Interim Governing Council was installed, with its proportional representation ofdiiferent
ethnic and religious groups, the AMS accused the United States of introducing a form of
political representation that undermined the Iraqi nation.-" Instead of introducing a more
equitable political system that would give formerly discriminated persecuted groups
equal rights, the proportional system was regarded as a deliberate means of destroying
national unity by playing the "sectarian card" (ai-waraqa al-ta 'ifiyya). Muhammad
Ayyash al-Kubaysi was convinced that the American aim was to install in the Iraqi
Shi'i community the idea that they were an oppressed sect (al-ta 'ifa al-mathluma).il'
Outraged by the American claim that the American presence had prevented civil
war, the AMS held thai the Americans were in fact the reason for civil strife and that
without them, the Iraqi religious and ethnic communities could solve their problems
by themselves and "live peacefully together" (al-ia'ayush al-sihni). Moreover, the
AMS denied that Shi'is had been discriminated against during the Saddam era, or in
any other previous era, for that matter, claiming that they had even formed a majority
in the branches and the leadership of the Ba'th Party and had always occupied high
positions in government.*"
Fifth, in line with its counter argument that Iraq was really a united nation, the
AMS cleverly used the insurgency in Falluja to propagate its Arab and Islamic program
of unity between Shi'is and Sunnis. This platform had a twofold purpose. While on the
one hand, it addressed the pan-Arabism and the indivisibility of Iraq as a nation, with
an eye to the Ba'thists who played an important role in the resistance, it on the other
hand tried to win over the Shi'is to join the insurgency, by stressing their Arab, Iraqi,
and Muslim identity rather than their shared identity with their Iranian co-religionists.
Highlighting this aspect of Shi'i strategy was directed especially at Muqtada al-Sadr,
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the main rival of the pro-Iranian SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Isiamic Revolution
in Iraq) and who had pro-Iraqi sentiments/* It was also a means of splitting the Shi'is
into rival factions and weakening them.
On the practical and politica! level, the AMS transformed this concept of national
unity into a campaign of Sunni-Shi'i solidarity. On 8 April 2004, a few days after the
start of the first American offensive against Falluja, the AMS organized a massive
demonstration that portrayed the offensive as an attempt not only to destroy the insur-
gency but to destroy the Islamic movement as a whole, both Sunni and Shi'i." During
this demonstration 200,000 Sunni and Shi'i demonstrators came together in front of
the Umm al-Qura mosque, shouting slogans of national solidarity, such as "No Sunna
and no Shi'a. Yes to Muslim unity!" and, "We are Sunni and Shi'i brothers and we will
never sell our country." Falluja was presented as the symbol of the joint Sunni and Shi 'i
struggle for independence.6" This campaign was continued in the spring and summer of
2004, during the uprising in Najaf and Karbala" led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who became
the most important Shi'i contact of the AMS.61 During the American clampdown on
Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf in July and August, Muthanna al-Dhari expressed his support,
fearing that if the Mahdi Army failed to withstand the Americans, the latter would
turn their attention to Falluja in the autumn,61 while Harith al-Dhari tried to organize
another demonstration at the Umm al-Qura mosque.61
On the institutional level, the AMS tried to maintain the Sunni-Shi'i momentum by
organizing a National Constitutive Congress (Mu Îamaral-Ta'sisial-Watani)on 8 May
to oppose the transfer of power on 30 June 2004." It consisted of a coalition of Iraqi
leftists, nationalists, and Islamists from various tendencies who had opposed Saddam's
regime but who also refused to take part in an appointed 'Allawi government. It had
the same political program as the AMS, and was headed by the Shi'i shaykh Jawad
al-Khaiisi, who was elected secretary-general of the organization. Another important
member was the Shi'i marja'. Ahmad al-Husni al-Baghdadi, who stated that the role of
the organization was to "encourage unity and end the division between the madhhabs
that has sprung up."4' But the most important participant was the group of Muqtada
al-Sadr. Different multi-religious and multi-ethnic organizations constantly popped
up during these meetings, such as the Society of 'ulama ' of United Iraq (Jam 'iyyat
'Ulama ' at- 'Iraq al-Muwahhada)!*
This institutional effort was supported by an ideological campaign by the AMS to
weaken the cooperation of the Shi'is with the Americans by turning their own political
themes against them. One of the main arguments used against the Shi'is was that their
cooperation with the Americans was tantamount to a betrayal of their own ideology
of resistance, which had sprung up since the Iranian revolution. The AMS ideologues
especially repeated again and again that themartyrdom of the Imam Husayn at Karbala'
was an example for ail who those seeking to defend Islam against the invasion of the
unbelievers. According to Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi, the Imam Husayn had
established a school of martyrdom (madrasat al-Husayn al-istishhadiyya). Accord-
ing to him, the Shi 'i hawza 's disregard of this tradition demonstrated that the matter
of resistance was about issues of "belief' ('aqida), "principle" (mabda'). "morals"
(akhlaq), and "schooling" (madrasd). The implication is that the Sunnis are, at the
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moment, at the forefront of this battle and that apart from Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shi'i
religious establishment has deviated from its own religious teachings.*7 According to
the Saudi Salafi 'alim A'itb al-Qami, the Shi'is were helping "to erase the identity [of
Iraq] and [destroy] its personality and [change] it into a source of further destruction
in the region, by supporting the "crusading forces."68
Hegemony of the AMS
How effective was the threefold strategy of the AMS in boycotting the American
sponsored political institutions, supporting the insurgency, politically and ideologically,
and trying to form an alliance with dissident Shi'i leader Muqtada al-Sadr?
Answering this question needs to take into account the reaction both of AMS'
Sunni rivals and of its rea! opponents, SCIR1, the Da'wa Party, and the Americans.
As for the first group, it seems that the AMS did achieve hegemony over its rivals.
The major test case was the first general elections of 30 January 2005. In accordance
with its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, and in contrast with the Salafi movement,
the AMS is not in principle against elections. In several of its communiqués and press
conferences it has supported democracy and has spoken out in support of the "will of
the people" (iradat al-sha 'b) as a means of limiting the power of the ruler.69 Its main
argument against holding elections is that "under the occupation" the Iraqi people are
not free to choose their representatives."0 It was therefore not surprising that the AMS
called for a boycott of the first general elections."1 On 6 October, Muhammad Bashar
al-Faydhi, the official spokesman of the AMS. condemned the gênerai elections that
were scheduled for January as a "comedy" (mahzala)?- At the end of the month he
threatened again to boycott the elections if the Americans did not call off their military
campaign against the insurgents in the Sunni triangle. He said they could only be "fake
elections" (inlikhabatsuriyya).^As was the case with the other institutions the Americans
had promoted, AMS regarded the elections as a means of consolidating the sectarian
divide. At this stage the AMS was unaware of the momentum that the "democratic"
politica] process would acquire. Harith al-Dhari believed that the "non-participation
of the Sunnis in drawing up the permanent constitution, which the parliament was
scheduled to draw up, will not have any influence. In any case, the constitution cannot
be worse than the TAL that we have opposed from the beginning.""4
If Faliuja had been an opportunity for the AMS to emerge as a political force, the
expansion of the insurgency helped establish that organization's political hegemony over
its rivals. First, the general elections were announced a moment after the first assault
on Faliuja in April had failed and the second assault was to be launched in November,
just after the 2004 election of President Bush. To make sure that none of its Sunni
rivals would waver in their boycott of the American sponsored political institutions,
the AMS launched a campaign to honor the name of Faliuja and the other cities of
Anbar province, which were bearing the brunt of the American attacks. In addition, it
stepped up efforts to give voice to the resistance and its legitimacy in fighting against
the occupation as the "honorable nationalist resistance" (al-muqawama al-sharifa wa
al-wataniyya).~* And while it spoke out in favor of armed attacks on Americans,76 it tried
to distance itself from terrorism by systematically issuing communiqués condemning
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bombattacks against Iraqi recruits and Shi'i civilians."7 These attacks were condemned as
an "incitement to sectarianism" (ihdathfitnala 'ifiyya).^ Third, despite the confrontation
with the great bulk of the Shi'is as represented by SC1RÎ and the Da'wa party, which
joined to form the United Iraqi Aliiance, and which had gained the support of Grand
Ayatollah'Ali al-Sistani, the AMS continued to support national unity. Theparticipation
of Shi'i shaykhs such as Ahmad al-Husni al-Baghdadi and Jawwad al-Khalisi in the
Iraqi Constitutive Conference (al-Mu 'tamaral-Ta'sisial- 'Iraqi) was meant to underline
the AMS' nationalist credentials. The AMS also strove to maintain good relations with
Muqtada al-Sadr, who, it was claimed, had been betrayed, like the Sunnis in Falluja,
by the Shi'i leaders who collaborated with the Americans. To consolidate this alliance,
the AMS erected Sunni-Shi'i organizations like the Iraqi Nationalist Forces in Uprising
Against the Occupation (al-Qima al-Wataniyya al-Munahida U ol-Ihtilal) and the
Charter of Understanding and National Action, whose seven resolutions had been
signed by sixty organizations and individuals of all sects and ethnic groups in Iraq.""
The joint delegation of Shi'is and Sunnis that emerged out of this initiative visited
several Arab countries to present the alternative program.*" Finally, another factor that
worked to the advantage of the AMS was the unwillingness of the Americans to speak
to the insurgents. Unwittingly. Secretary of State Powell's statement condemning the
insurgency because "they're terrorists, they're murderers, and they have no interest in
free, fair elections" helped the cause of the hardliners like the AMS.*1
The resonance of the strategy of the boycott of the AMS with the Sunni community
and the particular circumstances working to its advantage made it almost impossible
for the rivals of AMS to declare themselves in favor of the elections." The best that
the IIP, as well as 'Adnan a!-DuIaymi, could do was to argue in favor of postponing
the elections for half a year.SJ Eventually, however, one by one they succumbed to the
pressure of the circumstances. By the end of December 2004 they announced their
decision to boycott the elections, although the UP explicitly stated that it would not
withdraw from the "political process."*4 With the exception of Sunni moderates like
Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Samarra'i. who remained opposed to the boycott until the
very end, the boycott was complete a few weeks before the elections."
The boycott turned out to be a complete success for the AMS. Once the votes were
counted on 4 February, only seventeen thousand of as many as 250,000 eligible voters
from 'Anbarprovincehad voted, or 0.2 percent of the voters, although it must also partly
be ascribed to a fear of the lack of security when going to the polls.»6 Less than fifty
percent of eligible voters nation-wide had voted. Only seventeen Sunnis had managed
to acquire seats in the 275-seat parliament. In contrast, the Shi'i list, the United Iraqi
Alliance, won 150 seats, while Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters obtained twenty-three
seats, despite his rejection of the elections. This was a remarkable achievement for the
AMS, as the Americans had scored a major propaganda success by having organized
free elections in Iraq for the first time in history. Adopting the American presentation of
the elections as a victory for democracy, the international media lauded the democratic
attitudes of the Shi'is and condemned the Sunnis as spoilsports. The AMS itself,
however, paid a high price for its uncompromising stand. Tens of its members were
assassinated that winter.87 The AMS leadership was not spared, either: both Harith
al-Dhari and Bashar al-Faydhi lost brothers to assassins' bullets.88
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On the national level the price of opting out of politics was even higher. The elections
deepened the rift between Sunnis and Shi'is. While Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani,
called for "massive participation" (al-musharaka al-kathifa) in the elections, and one
'alim considered non-participation a "betrayal of [one's] national right" (khiyana bi-
haqq al-watan), issuing a fatwa regarding voting as a personal duty (fard 'ayn},** the
Sunnis felt betrayed as this enthusiasm for politics occurred at a time when Falluja
was on the point of being invaded and destroyed. The Sunni sentiment was expressed
by shaykh Mahdi al-Samadai of the Ibn Taymiyya mosque in Baghdad, who stated,
"When Najaf was attacked we all stood as one man [behind he Shi'i resistance]. Why
do the Iraqi people [Shi'i authorities] not support the people of Falluja now?"™ The
silence of Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani on Falluja and his studied neglect of the
resistance were considered a betrayal of the national cause and confirmed the worst
Sunni fears of the consequences of Shi'i-American collaboration."
Return of the Rivals
The hegemony of the AMS was short-lived. On 2 February 2005, 'Abd al-Salam
al-Kubaysi held a press conference in which he disqualified the elections because
the Sunni community was not represented in parliament. A communiqué of the AMS
supported this view, arguing that for this reason the incoming government could "not
negotiate on behalf of the population."': On the other hand, the AMS does seem to
have had some premonition of the awkward position it found itself in, for while it
stated that "the government lacks legitimacy," it also announced that "we respect [the
will of the people].""
It would prove to be much harder for the AMS to maintain a united Sunni front
and continue its pressure on its rivals once the elections had taken place and the
mechanism of politics reasserted itself. Already five days after the elections, the imam
of the Umm al-Qura mosque. Shaykh Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i, organized
a meeting between attendants at the Friday prayer and a spokesman of the Ministry
of Religious Endowments, who asked them to participate in the next elections, to be
held in December 2005, after the constitution had been drawn up.'4 In the meantime,
leading Sunni politicians, such as Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid, the secretary general of the
Islamic Iraqi Party, and Ghazi 'Ajil Yawar, the former interim president, and future
vice president met representatives of the United Iraqi Alliance, lyad al-Samarra'i,
assistant secretary-general of the Iraqi Islamic Party, confirmed the earlier policy of
his party, stating that "any proposal will be studied and considered," adding, "we have
not withdrawn from the political process."'- Later the Iraqi Islamic Party even denied
having participated in the boycott of the elections, claiming that it had not taken part
in the elections on account of the security situation in 'Anbar province.* A further
breach of unity occurred when Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Sammara'i announced that a
General Conference of the Iraqi People (al-Mu 'tamaral- 'Amm li-Ahfal- 'Iraq) would
be held and that its aim was "to prepare to join the process of drafting the permanent
constitution and to encourage broad Sunni participation in the next elections."97 Later
he claimed that the resistance had adopted "a big change in strategy."™
104 » Arab Studies Journal » Fall 20051 Spring 2006
Speculation on the split within Sunni ranks was strengthened by rumours about
negotiations between the Americans and the resistance leaders." To put an end to these
rumours, Harith al-Dhari stepped in and gave a rare interview to the New York rimes
in which he denied there existed dissident voices and repeated the official position of
the AMS: no participation without a timetable for American troop withdrawal. !0° But
the tide could not be stemmed. Another major breach in the front occurred on 1 April,
when Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafbr al-Samarra'i read & fatwa signed by sixty-four Sunni
clerics and scholars that encouraged Iraqis to join the security forces to protect the
country and their own interests, otherwise the Shi'is would take them over.10' After
the vehement reaction of the AMS, 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i reportedly left the
AMS.102 A new impulse in this direction was given on 20 May when one thousand
Sunni shaykhs, clerics and political leaders from Baghdad and nearby cities convened
to form a new Sunni political alliance, the Sunni Block (al-Takattul al-Sunni), that
would lead in October to the establishment ofJabhat al-Tawafuq a!- 'Iraqi. That even
the AMS participated in this initiative shows how the political landscape had changed.
Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the leaders of the IIP, said during the conference: "We are
passing through a very hard time, and we decided that all Sunnis should gather and
rebuildourown house."The purposeoftheconference was "tobuild aconcrete coalition
for the next election,"'05 The Washington Post hailed the conference as the end of the
two-year boycott of the Sunni community of politics and quoted 'Adnan al-Dulaymi
as saying that "the Sunnis are now ready to participate [...]. We think it is time to take
steps to save Iraq's identity, and its unity and independence. Iraq is for all, and Iraq
is not sectarian."1"4 On 8 June he founded the Conference of the Sunni Council as a
political organ, a political act that led new president Jalal Talabani to fire him from
his position as head of the Sunni Waqf Endowment. This organization demanded the
drawing up of a constitution on the basis of "Iraqi national consensus" (ijma ' watani
'Iraqi) and repeated the main Sunni demands: a unified state, no decentralization of
the Arab provinces, and the retaining of Iraq's Arab identity. ""
This process of incorporation into the political process was enhanced when the
United Iraqi Alliance succeeded in forming a government at the end of April with the
common Kurdish list and they started taking over government institutions, underlin-
ing the increasing marginalization of the Sunnis and the failure of the strategy of the
boycott. It is here that the second part of the strategy of the AMS, to draw Muqtada
al-Sadr into a nationalist front, proved to be most ephemeral. Although his followers
occupied twenty-three seats in the new parliament, in the end their Shi'i solidanty or
opportunism prevailed over their common political program with the Sunni insurgency,
despite the severe differences of opinion with SCIR1. Muqtada al-Sadr limited his
actions during the following period to intermediating between SCIR1 leaders and the
AMS, after the AMS accused the militia of SC1RI, the Badr Brigades, of assassinating
its members. Other joint Sunni-Shi'i manifestations of solidarity were expressed in
the Noble National Manifesto (al-Mithaq al-Sharafal- Watani), which demanded the
immediate withdrawal of American troops.10* The frustration of Muqtada al-Sadr's
followers with the political situation was channelled into a march of 300,000 men to
Firdus Square on the second anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein.'07
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On the other hand, it was apparent that the Sunni insurgency had not lost its force
and that intra-sectarian violence was growing. Indiscriminate bomb attacks, executions
of Sunms and Shi'is, and the assassination of clerics marked a new phase in violence in
Iraq in the period after the elections. As a result of the increasing Iraqization of the war,
Sunni-Shi'i sectarian strife seemed to be replacing the struggle between the Sunnisand
the Americans. By 22 March 2005, attacks on Americans had decreased to twenty-two
a month while car bomb attacks against civilians jumped from sixty-four in February
to 135 in April. In contrast to the previous year, when twenty-five car bombings had
occurred in Baghdad, there were twenty-one car bombings in Baghdad in May alone.
That month proved one of the bloodiest of the war, with eight hundred Iraqis and eighty
American troops killed. w The attacks climbed from a daily rate of between thirty and
forty from February to March to an average of seventy a day in May."" In April, the
mixed Shi'i-Sunni town of Mada'in south of Baghdad became notorious as an example
of ethnic sectarian cleansing,110 while it became common forSunnis from Baghdad and
the mixed regions to be found executed blindfolded with their hands tied behind their
backs."1 The AMS became involved in these incidents, reacting to them in its com-
muniqués and issuing a report on the Mada'in affair.1 ! In protest, it shut its mosques
for three days in May.1" The relations between SCIRI and AMS deteriorated further
after the AMS accused the Badr Brigades, now acting as a government security force,
of killing Sunni clerics,"4 and the Conference of Sunni People called for the resigna-
tion of the Minister of Interior11' The Shi'is retaliated in kind. After a suicide bomb
attack on the Shiite mosque of al-Sabih in east Baghdad claimed numerous victims,
the governor of Najaf demanded that "the AMS, which claims to lead the Sunni sect,
take a decisive stand against this criminality.""" Even moderate Shi'is held the AMS
responsible for the increasing conflict between Sunnis and Shi'is. They reasoned that
if the AMS had supported the elections and had distanced itself more clearly from al-
Zarqawi, there would have been much fewer attacks on Shi'is.""
The AMS and the Political Process
The AMS found itself caught in the middle between the Sunni insurgency and
the incorporation into the political process of the Sunni political parties. Its response
was to revert back to the more aloof position of the Sunnj "religious authority,"
leaving "the political process" to more overtly political organizations. This explains
why it had no answer to the establishment of the new coalition government in April
of the Shi'i-Kurdish government under Ibrahim Ja'fari and the inexorable train of
political developments the Americans had designed to keep what they regarded as
the democratic momentum going: the appointment of a constitutional council in May,
the referendum on the constitution on 15 October, and the new general elections to
be held on 15 December. In all of these events, the AMS played a minor and passive
role whereas its rivals played an increasingly more active part, taking the initiative
in finding a way out of the impasse of the boycott. For instance, when Condoleezza
Rice flew to Baghdad to urge the Shi'is and Kurds to include more than two Sunnis
on the fifty-five member constitutional committee, the AMS' comment was that her
endeavor consisted of "only words without meaning.""* In con trast.'Adnanal-Dulaymi
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welcomed her involvement on the side of the Sunnis."" Although the AMS did play
a role in the negotiations with the constitutional committee on the issue of including
fifteen full Sunni members and ten advisors, it did not, in line with its uncompromising
stand, join the committee, which was left to members of the IIP and the Iraqi National
Dialogue Front of Salih al-Mutlaq. Neither did it consolidate its position when these
political groups rejected the final draft of the constitution, which could be regarded as
a vindication of the AMS policy.
Throughout these events, the AMS upheld its official position of boycotting politi-
cal institutions as long as the American troops had not withdrawn. Its policy was partly
based on the miscalculation that the Shi'is and Kurds could not rule the country without
including the Sunni community.12" It was partly based on the principle - adopted from
Hamas' earlier stance - that joining the political process would legitimate the American
presence. Even as late as May 2005, when the government had already been formed
and SCIRI had gained control over the Ministry of the Interior, Harith al-Dhari stated
in an interview with al-Jazeera that boycotting the elections had been a good idea.121
In one of its statements the AMS even added another condition for participation in the
political process, namely that the government should regard the insurgency against the
American occupation asa legitimate nationalist act.1-As for the constitutional committee
that had to present a draft by 15 August, the AMS was firmly opposed to members of
parliament taking part in this process, arguing, "[I]t is important that the constitution
is drawn up by the people of Iraq, far from the influence of the Americans."125
Three events provide further insight into the position the AMS adopted towards
politics as a "religious authority." They also provide insight into its définition of politics
"under occupation." On 19 August, when the outlines of the constitution became
clear, Muhammad 'Ayyash al-Kubaysi issued a faMa on both the referendum and
the elections.12' Basing himself on the principles ofal-'amr bi al-ma'rufwa al-nahi
'an al-munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong), he considered it the duty
of every voter to register himself and cast his or her vote. Later, the AMS, like all
the Sunni political organizations, would reject the constitution.1" As for the general
elections themselves, Muhammad al-Kubaysi supported the Sunnis' participation in
them but only according to very strict conditions. His premise was that according to
the shari'a it is not permitted for a Muslim to cast his or her vote in a country that is
occupied by non-believers, or at least that this would only be allowed in exceptional
circumstances when it is a matter of survival and therefore becomes a "necessity"
(darura). Consequently, political parties can only take part in the political process on
four conditions. First, they must subordinate politics to wagingjihad and the armed
struggle to evict the occupier; second, they are not allowed to reach an agreement
(muhadana) with the adversary that might transcend the boundaries of al-wala ' wa
al-bara' (loyalty and keeping distance); third, their politics must serve only the
purpose of evicting the adversary; and fourth, they must realize that they are bound
by the mandate of the whole nation and cannot decide issues on their own. Although
the fatwa was commonly regarded as an endorsement of the political process and
thus as a major turning point, the Arabic press missed the highly limited conditions
in which it is permissible to take part in the political process.12* Interestingly, one of
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the six insurgent groups that announced a ceasefire during the referendum caught the
essence of the position of the AMS when it called the referendum "a form of jihad. "ul
The AMS participated in many demonstrations held in the Sunni Triangle after the
final publication of the constitution on 28 August and called upon Iraqis to "use all
legal means that our people regard as effective to have the constitution withdrawn."
Its basically anti-political stand was confirmed in its warning against participating in
the elections - it stated, "If you want to participate in the referendum, you are warned
that the enemy propaganda will do anything to mislead you. because in the past it has
stolen your vote and in the absence of international supervision it will do so again
during the referendum."'2*
The Conference of National Conciliation (Mu'lamar ai-Wafaq al-Warani), in
which the main Shi'i, Kurdish, and Sunni organizations participated, except for
Muqtada al-Sadr. was held in Cairo between 19 and 21 November under the aegis of
the Arab League, confirmed the political line of the AMS. The conference confirmed
the importance ofthe AMS as a majorrepresentative ofthe Sunni community and even
signified a major success on its part, as it accepted one ofthe main points of the AMS'
program: acceptance ofthe legality ofthe armed resistance against the Americans and
the rejection of terrorism against innocent Iraqis. In its final communiqué, the AMS
also rejected the broad de-Ba'thification process, limiting it to Ba'thists who had
implicated themselves in the crimes ofthe previous regime. One ofthe highlights was
a meeting between Harith al-Dhari and Ibrahim Ja'fari and Hamam al-Hammudi of
SCIRI. It was the first time the AMS leader had met his Shi'i counterparts. Although
the final communiqué provoked an outcry from Barzani and 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim,
who had not participated, most agreed that it was an important step towards some
form of conciliation.12'
The position ofthe AMS was further underlined during the general elections of
December. In an interview with the TV station al-Arabiyya, Harith al-Dhari repeated
the official position that the AMS rejected the political process under occupation, but
that it would adopt a completely neutral stance. It would neither support those partici-
pating in the elections nor those in favor of boycotting them. It would stay away from
the elections and not hamper their process. It would "respect the choice ofthe Iraqis
to participate or not to participate in the elections, and calls upon all Iraqis to refrain
from imposing their will upon each other and to respect one another."110 However,
this neutral position was less significant than it may have appeared, because, as the
interviewer surmised, the AMS probably favored the Ba'thist National Iraqi Dialogue
Front of Salih al-Mutlaq, which was less inclined to compromise with the Shi'i and
Kurdish parties after the elections.
Conclusions
The AMS was and remains an important political expression ofthe Sunni commu-
nity after the collapse ofthe regime of Saddam Hussein. Its precise overall relevance,
though, is difficult to determine. Its unique strategy of boycotting the "political pro-
cess" and supporting the insurgency, as long as the Americans continue to "occupy"
Iraq, while trying to build an alliance with the radical Muqtada al-Sadr, has placed
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the AMS in an entirely different position from that of other Sunni political forces that
are willing to move from the phase of violence and disruption to the phase of politi-
cal participation based on negotiation with the Shi'is and the Americans. This unique
position is also manifested in the framework it has constructed for itself, one that bor-
rows from different sources. In an attempt to cover a wide spectrum of ideologies, it
not only reaches out to the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, but also includes a pan-
Arab and 'Iraq first' ideology characteristic of the Ba'th party; njihadi Salafi ideology
with regard to self-sacrifice, jihad, and its interpretation ofai-wala 'wa al-bara '; and
the condemnation of the moderate 'ulama '. This ideology has offered the resistance
an important alternative to the Salafi jihadi radicalism of uncompromising war and
terror, to the political compromise of the IIP, as well as to the tribal discourse of honor.
Framing resistance in this manner has been a successful means of mobilizing the Sunni
community for a short period between the first assault on Falluja in April 2004 until
the formation of the Ja'fari government a year later. During that period, the AMS
succeeded in ideologically focusing the Sunni insurgency and bringing about unity
between the different Sunni political organizations, which reached its apogee during
the elections of January 2005. Afterwards, its preponderance was lost but its influence
has remained considerable, as was apparent at the Cairo conference in November 2005.
More than the other political organizations, the AMS tries to reconcile the demands
and the spirit of the insurgency with the pragmatic realization that eventually politics
are inevitable. In this capacity, it has contributed a new, albeit destructive, dimension
to Muslim resistance discourse in Iraq.
Whether the AMS will regain its preeminent position as a powerful player in the
future remains another matter. The strategy of confrontation, boycott, and support of
the insurgency by the AMS has exacerbated its relations with the Shi'is. Despite its
good relations with Muqtada al-Sadr, the AMS did not succeed in winning over his
movement to forming a coalition with the Sunni insurgency, or even with the Sunni
politicai parties, which would have meant a major breakthrough in Sunm-Shi ' i relations.
The AMS itself is partly to blame for this failure. Falling back on its particular aloof
position as a "religious authority" with regard to politics has not enhanced its position
as a viable partner. Its belated and insufficient condemnation of al-Zarqawi and its
accusation of the Badr Brigades of terrorism condemned the AMS in the eyes of
SCIRI, while for Muqtada al-Sadr the AMS was probably too close to the Ba'thists
to be acceptable as a reliable ally against its Shi'i competitors. Iraqi politics at this
stage,"1 however, is extremely fluid and unpredictable, and it is quite possible that the
AMS will remain an important player, especially if the attempts to revive the political
process by the IIP fail and Shi'i and Kurdish leaders refuse to make concessions to
the Sunni community.
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